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 construction may be a reaction to individualistic
 rational choice theory. Now human cognition
 does not make us very good natural logicians or
 natural statisticians, but we are remarkably effec-
 tive at making sense by making patterns, and we
 are usually strongly motivated to create patterns
 and use them as a basis for action (economists as
 much as any group); moreover, the similarity be-
 tween human brains facilitates the adoption of
 other people's patterns to supplement our
 own-for individual comprehension even before
 co-ordination.
 White neglects Knight's observation that we
 group phenomena by similarities while ignoring
 differences that are deemed irrelevant. Now, as
 Popper observed, any such grouping implies a
 point of view, and points of view may differ.
 Adam Smith realized that the division of labor
 encouraged a variety of viewpoints, thus making
 better use of our collective capacity for pattern
 making. Different contexts of similarity produce
 different interpretative systems, cultures and
 subcultures, on which White relies-and also dis-
 puted interpretations, paradigm shifts, and mis-
 guided consensus such as the vision of the tele-
 coms market that produced the history of
 WorldCom and its peers; within a market they
 may produce the developing capabilities and per-
 ceptions of productive opportunities that charac-
 terize a Penrosian firm, and so explain, as White
 does not, the alignment of firms with market
 niches. A treatment of capabilities, including
 transaction capabilities (on which Mark Casson
 has focused) is a natural complement to White's
 scheme.
 The selective connections in that scheme find
 a natural complement in the selective connec-
 tions that constitute knowledge-and it is knowl-
 edge that orders information. Knowledge is con-
 jecture and therefore provisional; its reliability is
 a crucial issue for the effectiveness and durability
 of any of the markets discussed by White. It is
 notable that Ziman (1978, Reliable Knowledge,
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2000,
 Real Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University
 Press), in appraising the reliability of scientific
 knowledge, links human cognition to inter-
 subjectivity and consensibility, and emphasizes
 the importance of structures, norms, commit-
 ment, and processes, thus providing both similar-
 ities and contrasts to the operation of markets.
 White's production markets are a form of organi-
 zation that aids knowledge (though subject to er-
 rors both great and small).
 We act on the basis of representations; to ana-
 lyze the actions of others we construct represen-
 tations of their representations. White is well
 aware of this, and organizes his discussion and
 designs his models accordingly. Both deserve
 careful consideration and a fair trial.
 BRIAN J. LOASBY
 University of Stirling
 Economic Efficiency in Law and Economics. By
 Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. Cheltenham, U.K., and
 Northampton, Mass.: Elgar; distributed by
 American International Distribution Corpora-
 tion, Williston, Vt., 2001. Pp. v, 328. $95.00,
 cloth; $35.00, paper. ISBN 1-84064-301-3,
 cloth; 1-84064-611-X, pbk. JEL 2002-0046
 This is a very ambitious book with a rather un-
 pretentious title. The reader gets some inkling
 that this is no garden variety law and economics
 text when Zerbe introduces the concept of KHZ
 efficiency, as in Kaldor-Hicks-Zerbe efficiency.
 KHZ efficiency is the central organizing concept
 of the book, and the book's worth stands or falls
 on the usefulness of this concept.
 Before exploring KHZ efficiency in depth,
 Zerbe has a nice discussion of the distinctions be-
 tween equivalent variation, compensating varia-
 tion, willingness to pay, and willingness to accept,
 and a detailed analysis of the strengths and weak-
 nesses of the Kaldor-Hicks concept of efficiency.
 Zerbe also makes a useful distinction between
 transaction costs that relate to changing legal
 rules and transaction costs that relate to the
 transfer of entitlements under existing legal
 rules. Only the latter count in determining
 whether an existing legal rule is efficient. That is,
 a legal rule is inefficient if there exists an alterna-
 tive rule which will more likely result in entitle-
 ments going to higher valued users. It is irrele-
 vant for this determination if transaction costs
 prevent this alternative rule from being adopted.
 This is important because otherwise all existing
 legal rules would be efficient tautologically.
 As for KHZ efficiency, it is Kaldor-Hicks effi-
 ciency writ large, very large. The underlying
 premise is that anything that anyone is willing to
 pay for should be considered a good, and that the
 appropriate cost-benefit analysis is one that sums
 up willingness to pay for all of these "goods." This
 seemingly simple premise resolves in a formal
o ic Ef iciency in Law and Economics. By
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 way many of the conundrums that bedevil cost-
 benefit analysis and law and economics. It is the
 ultimate working out of the tradition in law and
 economics that Richard Posner called "wealth
 maximization."
 For example, should compensation be paid to
 losers or is the potential to pay compensation, as in
 Kaldor-Hicks, sufficient for a change to pass the
 cost-benefit test? The answer for Zerbe depends
 upon whether the population as a whole has a pos-
 itive willingness to pay compensation to losers. If
 the population is willing to pay for a compensation
 system, then paying compensation is KHZ effi-
 cient and not paying compensation would be KHZ
 inefficient. Zerbe puts such feelings, backed by
 dollars, into a category called "regard for others."
 The "regard for others" category, however, has
 much wider implications than resolving the com-
 pensation conundrum. Consider the difficulty
 presented for wealth maximization by the fact
 that some people are willing to pay for the right
 to commit bad acts. According to KHZ, the effi-
 ciency of prohibiting such acts depends upon the
 culprit's willingness to pay versus the victim and
 everyone else's need to accept payment. Zerbe
 rightly notes that bad acts are less likely to pass a
 KHZ test than a traditional cost-benefit test since
 everyone, and not just the victim, gets to weigh in
 on the question.
 But, what about acts that some people con-
 sider bad and others do not-such as homosexu-
 ality? Well, that also gets put up for a KHZ vote.
 So, if more people are willing to pay to prohibit
 homosexual acts than homosexuals and civil lib-
 ertarians need to be paid to accept such a prohi-
 bition, then homosexuality is inefficient. As
 Zerbe notes, KHZ efficiency is completely de-
 pendent on the population's values-it is not an
 independent standard of what is right. KHZ is
 only as moral as the sentiments of the people.
 Zerbe claims that the strength of KHZ is its
 practicality in that it provides a mechanism to de-
 cide what the society wants. It aspires to no
 greater claim of objective truth than this. Yet, one
 can question whether such a wide-ranging survey
 of everyone's willingness to pay is practicable.
 One virtue of traditional cost-benefit analysis is
 that by limiting the calculations to those immedi-
 ately affected by a project, it limits the universe
 of sentiments that must be sampled.
 Aside from practicality, KHZ and wealth maxi-
 mization are morally and theoretically problem-
 atic in that it is questionable whether any system
 with so little a priori input can ever give satisfac-
 tory answers. At a theoretical level, general equi-
 librium theory takes endowments (or entitle-
 ments) as given a priori, and trade proceeds from
 there. General equilibrium theory does not at-
 tempt to bootstrap the distribution of endow-
 ments from within itself.
 In a related point, Zerbe claims that KHZ effi-
 ciency does not suffer from the Scitovsky Para-
 dox, but this is unlikely. KHZ, after all, is simply a
 voting system where votes are weighted by will-
 ingness to pay. As such, it cannot escape Arrow's
 Impossibility Theorem, and intransitivities are
 likely to arise. "Regard for others" exacerbates
 this problem. One need get no more technical
 than the "Gift of the Magi" to realize the para-
 doxes that can emerge when I am willing to pay
 to make you happy and you are willing to pay to
 make me happy.
 While Zerbe does not claim that KHZ is a
 moral system, "regard for others" has the poten-
 tial to ride roughshod over any sense of individ-
 ual autonomy. Under KHZ, I have no more right
 to determine what I may do than others have in
 determining what I may do. The only constraint
 on "busy-body" tastes is that the busy bodies may
 be too cheap to pay for their tastes. Clearly, the
 system could be improved by reasonable a priori
 limits on what tastes can count.
 MARK KUPERBERG
 Swarthmore College
 E Macroeconomics and Monetary
 Economics
 Financial Policy and Central Banking in Japan.
 By Thomas F. Cargill, Michael M. Hutchison,
 and Takatoshi Ito. Cambridge and London:
 MIT Press, 2000. Pp. viii, 196. $27.95. ISBN
 0-262-03285-6. JEL 2001-0977
 This book is the sequel to the authors' 1997
 book, The Political Economy of Japanese Mone-
 tary Policy (MIT Press), which examined the de-
 velopment of the central banking and financial
 system in Japan from the 1950s to the 1990s. The
 authors started working on this sequel shortly be-
 fore the publication of the first book. They knew
 that the new Bank of Japan Act would be imple-
 mented in April 1998, and planned to analyze the
 impact of the institutional reform on monetary
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.13 on Thu, 21 Sep 2017 15:58:53 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
